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shortly after a forcible arrest. It should be noted that the confession
was excluded even though no objection'to its admission was made
at the trial.21 Although this decision seems to follow the spirit of the
McNabb case, the facts do not appear sufficiently shocking to justify
the holding of the case. The evidence tended to show that force was
applied only for the purpose of effecting the arrest and that no coercion was employed to extract the confession. This holding will place
an additional burden on law enforcement officers and will engraft
another rule onto the law of evidence, a field already renowned for its
complexity.
ROBERT V. PARKER

EVIDENCE: LIMITATION ON DISCRETIONARY ADMISSION
OF SUBSEQUENT REPAIR EVIDENCE
Miami Beach v. Wolfe, 83 So.2d 774 (Fla.1955)
A pedestrian injured in a fall allegedly caused by a depression in
the city sidewalk prosecuted a negligence action against the city for
damages. Defendant in its opening statement maintained that a
depression did not exist at the time of the accident. Plaintiff offered
evidence, specifically objected to by defendant, showing repairs to
the sidewalk after the accident. The trial court ruled the evidence
admissible to contradict defendant's opening statement. On appeal
from a judgment for plaintiff, HELD, evidence of subsequent repairs
to an instrumentality alleged to have been negligently maintained is
not admissible to contradict an opening contention that the defect
never existed. Judgment reversed.
The general rule in the vast majority of jurisdictions prevents the
admission of evidence of repairs made after an accident when it is
offered to show antecedent negligence or an admission of negligence.1
The courts realize that instrumentalities such as sidewalks, bridges, or
machines are capable of inflicting injuries despite the owner's reasonable foresight and diligence in construction and maintenance; the
accident may be unavoidable or due solely to the negligence of the
2lAt 797. The court here relied upon FEn. R. CRIM. P. 52 (b), which provides
that "plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although
they were not brought to the attention of the court."
12 WIGORE, EVIDENC E §283 (3d ed. 1940).
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person injured. 2 This reasoning is reinforced by the design to encourage owners to repair or improve the accident-producing objects
without fear that alterations may result in damaging evidence being
admitted against them. 3 This policy was planned to encourage the
negligent as well as the nonnegligent owner to use the lesson learned
to incorporate all safety factors reasonably calculated to avoid another
4
accident.
General rules of relevancy and propriety required the courts to
declare exceptions to this rule. Some well-recognized exceptions permitting evidence of subsequent repairs are invoked when the plaintiff seeks to prove the owner's control of the premises, 5 the defendant's
duty to make repairs,6 any immediate repairs as an incidental part
of the object's condition at the time of the accident7 and that the
injury was brought about in the manner alleged;8 evidence of alterations made after the accident is frequently admitted to rebut the
defendant's case 9 or contradict his witnesses.1°
In 1925 the Florida Supreme Court adopted the general rule in
rejecting evidence of subsequent repairs offered as proof of prior negligence. 1 In a more recent case' 2 the Court admitted evidence of
2

See Millman v. United States Mtge. & Title Guaranty Co., 121 N.J.L. 28, 1 A.2d
265 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
3See Nalley v. Hartford Carpet Co., 51 Conn. 584, 50 Am. Rep. 47 (1884);
Morse v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 30 Minn. 465, 16 N.W. 358 (1883).
4Railroad v. Wyatt, 104 Tenn. 432, 434, 58 S.W. 308, 309 (1900) (dictum).
5E.g., Burnwell Coal Co. v. Setzer, 191 Ala. 398, 67 So. 604 (1914); Georgia R. &
Elec. Co. v. Tompkins, 138 Ga. 596, 75 S.E. 664 (1912); Antonsen v. Bay Ridge Sav.
Bank, 292 N.Y. 143, 54 N.E.2d 338 (1944).
6E.g., Lafayette v. Weaver, 92 Ind. 477 (1884); Carleton v. Rockland T. & C.
Street Ry., 110 Me. 397, 86 At. 334 (1913); Bianchetti v. Luce, 222 Mo. App. 282,
2 S.V.2d 129 (1927).
7E.g., Alabama City, G. &: A. Ry. v. Appleton, 171 Ala. 324, 54 So. 638 (1911);
Eargle v. Sumter Lighting Co., 110 S.C. 560, 96 S.E. 909 (1918).
8E.g., Brazil Block Coal Co. v. Gibson, 160 Ind. 319, 66 N.E. 882 (1903); Shelton
v. Southern Ry., 193 N.C. 670, 139 S.E. 232 (1927); Green v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 136
S.C. 337, 134 S.E. 385 (1926).
9E.g., Achey v. Marion, 126 Iowa 47, 101 N.W. 435 (1904); Overby v. Mears
Mining Co., 144 Mo. App. 363, 128 S.W. 813 (1910); Weaver v. Wheeling Traction
Co., 91 W. Va. 528, 114 S.E. 131 (1922).
'oE.g., Bedgood v. T. R. Miller Mill Co., 202 Ala. 299, 80 So. 364 (1918); Frierson
v. Frazier, 142 Ala. 232, 37 So. 825 (1904); Jerolaman v. Belleville, 90 NJ.L. 206,
101 At. 244 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
"Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Parks, 89 Fla. 405, 104 So. 587 (1925).
2Florida Power & Light Co. v. Brinson, 67 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1953) (alternative
holding).
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repairs made after the accident when its purpose was to contradict the
defendant's case as distinguished from an attempt to show the owner's
conscious admission of negligence. It has also held that during the
cross-examination of a witness such evidence may be used to attack
his credibility. 13
In the instant case, defendant contended that there was no depression in the sidewalk; this contention should be vulnerable to contradiction by showing the subsequent repairs. The trial court admitted the tendered evidence during the plaintiff's part of the case
in contradiction of the defendant's nonevidentiary allegation of fact.
The Supreme Court stated that to admit evidence of repairs made after
the accident occurred would undermine the very purpose of the rule,
despite a careful charge to the jury emphasizing that the evidence
could be considered only to show the existence of a depression and
not the existence of negligence. The Court did not mention the fact
that the rule is based not upon policy alone but upon a recognition of
its salutary effect in preventing the introduction of collateral issues.
In this instance the defendant raised the issue of the hole's existence.
Although this case may be distinguished from a previous Florida case 4
in which admission of subsequent repair evidence was approved, the
distinction is not great enough to justify the reversal of the trial
court's discretionary ruling that the benefit to be gained by resolving
the issue of the depression's existence outweighed the possible prejudicial inference of the defendant's negligence. If the Supreme Court
intended to rest its decision on the point that this defendant's evidence did not raise the issue, this ruling was not clearly delineated.
The exception that was denied validity in this case is one that is
occasionally needed to permit fairness and flexibility in a trial situation. The lower court is in a better position than an appellate court
to estimate its effect; to deny this exception is to cast doubt on other
Florida cases permitting no more cogent exceptions to the general
rule. Given the proper trial circumstances, however, the earlier Florida cases recognizing clear exceptions to the general rule should be
much more persuasive than the ruling in the instant case.
HALE BAUGH
23Wilson & Toomer Fertz. Co. v. Lee, 90 Fla. 632, 652, 106 So. 462, 469 (1925).
14Florida Power & Light Co. v. Brinson, 67 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1953) (alternative
holding) (no direct evidence available to establish time when order for repair was
issued by defendant; plaintiff's evidence of time when repair actually made, after
the accident, admitted as relevant circumstantial evidence).
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